Almost everything of the following was taken from books of Morris N. Eagle, "Core Concepts" (on classical and contemporary psychoanalysis). While his works omit neurological perspectives, research on these themes can be found here - https://psyct.psychopen.eu/article/view/328/html
Note that the following is only a reading and are excerpts (most of the time - without relevant context) of an amateur. To fully process and understand implications of Eagle's critique, you must buy and read both of his books. If you read closely, you will also notice some peculiar contradictions, especially at the concluding passage.
Also note that unconscious processes and their artifacts (wishes, fantasies, etc) - are absolutely different things. No amount of psychoanalysis can heal a broken unconscious process in schizotypal person which has two wills and can't control his primary one.
- Freud formulations of the descriptive unconscious are far more relevant to contemporary cognitive theory and research.
- unconscious status of these representations is largely due to implicit learning and, to lesser extent, to defensive exclusion
- the individual somewhat at the mercy of influence from external stimuli of which s/he is unaware; this is reverse of the Freudian image of the individual
- a more plausible account of how we keep from experiencing and acknowledging conflictual and threatening mental contents is provided by concepts such as not spelling out (Fingarette, 1963) and failing to formulate (Stern, 2003). This also calls out for accounting the work "Mutative interpretation and close process monitoring in a study of psychoanalytic process" (Paul Gray, 2005) for detection of fleeting mental contents (surface phenomena) that barely escape our attention.
- there is a radical de-emphasis of the cornerstone concept of repression and correspondingly, of deeply buried instinctually derived unconscious impulses, wishes, desires, and fantasies.
- there has been an increased emphasis on unconscious representations that are unconscious, not primarily by virtue of repression, but largely because they have been acquired early in life, often pre-verbally.
- a topic remarkably absent, even in the literature of relational psychoanalysis, is what I refer to as the interpersonalizing of the unconscious; that is, although closely linked, there is a distinction to be made between what one will tell oneself and what one will tell others
- an early emphasis on uncovering repressed mental contents as an overarching process goal has essentially been replaced by the goals of understanding how one mind works and by enhancing the patient's capacity to reflect on his or her mental states and those of others with whom he or she interacts
- there is relatively little research on the axiomatic psychoanalytic claim that unconscious dynamic processes and psychopathology are inextricably linked, specifically, that unconscious processes play a causal role in psychopathology. Probably it relies heavily on status of integration of mental states in the personality structure rather than to their unconscious status per se.
- there is little or no evidence for the claim of the existence of universal incestuous and death wishes.
- ... who presents a highly convincing case that Little Hans' phobia is better explained by appeal to attachment theory rather than to oedipal theory.
- over the years, a number of neo-Westermarckian hypotheses have been proposed that identify a or the mechanism that may account for Westermarck effect
- people tend to select mates who are similar to themselves (and therefore - to family members)
- the early figure (surrogate parent or sibling) serves as the schema for the type of object the animal will court
- one is attracted to a potential mate who is sufficiently novel to trigger sexual interest and excitement and also sufficiently familiar
- the choice of mate who is very dissimilar to family members might maximize sexual interest, but render the formation of an attachment bond more and more difficult
- it seems to me that the tendency for sexual interest to become intensified with novelty and diversity, and dampen with prolonged propinquity
- attachment has more to do with feelings of security than of excitement
- familiarity is necessary for someone to serve as an attachment figure, whereas novelty...
- it is companionship, not sex, that is central factor in long-term relationships (habituation dampens sexual desire)
- the integration between love and desire is not a given, but a developmental psychological challenge and achievement
- good deal of evidence suggests that sensitive and responsive care, not sexual attraction, is the most accurate predictor of relationship longevity
- surprising finding was that measures of sexual behavior... did not make a unique contribution to intimacy in romantic relationship
- one theme that remains closer to the clinical material and is described with great sensitivity is how infidelity undermines not only trust in the other, but perhaps most important, "trust in one's own mind in relation to one's objects" (editor note: other people).
- I think it is fair to say that there is a relative consensus among contemporary psychoanalytic theorists and clinicians that persistence of early modes of relating and clinging to early object ties are pathological and, correspondingly, that developmental growth in modes of relating and object ties is an essential aspect of optimal development and mental health.
- It should be noted that the issues being discussed are not only of theoretical import, but also have important implications for treatment. Thus, if, for example, based on one's theoretical convictions, one believes that all male patients harbor unconscious incestuous wishes toward mother and hostile wishes toward father, one will be more likely to 'find' and interpret them in the patient's productions.
- based on cues emitted by therapist, patients may comply and produce material compatible with the therapists theoretical predilections
- editor note: the 30-year long "excommunication" of Bowlby on the grounds that attachment theory was not really psychoanalytic
- strong impression follows: (of Mr. Eagle) this attitude of discomfort with and even hostility toward empirical research is not limited to classical 'schools' and institutes. It extends to newer 'schools' and institutes, including those associated with relational psychoanalysis and self. Although psychoanalytic 'schools' may differ in their theoretical approach, they share a guild-like attitude in which loyalty to one's 'school' (ed: dojo? sect?), institute, and charismatic leaders counts far more than empirical evidence.
- it seems to me that the appropriate question is not "is there room for sexuality in psychoanalytic theory," but rather "what role does sexuality play in various aspects of psychological functioning and development, including the development of psychopathology."
- ...thus, sexual reductionism is replaced by object relational reductionism ...
- Although there is little or no research in this area, one regularly observes in clinical work the influence of other motivational systems upon such specifics of sexual behavior as achievement of orgasm, sense of satisfaction, nature of sexual fantasies, feelings of intimacy, post-coital mood, and so on.
- ... sexual behavior motivated by need for reassurance or need for self-cohesiveness or need for power ...
- The relinquishment of the Oedipus complex as a central factor in development of neurosis, gender identity, superego development, and mate choice and its replacement by an emphasis on the issues of differentiation and separation-individuation raises questions that need to be addressed regarding the role of sexuality in a wide range of psychopathology. It also raises questions regarding the 'proper' role of sexuality in psychic life and its interactions with other motivational systems that need to be addressed.
- I am not at all sure that "romantic love" is the best term to describe adult attachment. For as Mitchell (2002) has noted, there is often relatively little romance in long-term adult attachments. Perhaps the more neutral terms "adult attachment" or "pair-bonding" are more accurate.
- Fairbairn makes no reference to observations of infant or child behavior that would consitute evidence of such splitting. There is also no observational evidence presented to support the idea that a consequence of deprivation and frustration are splits in the ego into libidinal and anti-libidinal ego structures.
- ... even "bad" object relations are preferable to no object relations. The latter is experienced as unsustainable.
- It is important to reiterate that for many abused women, leaving the relationship is experienced as giving up not only an actual external relationship, but also an internal affective connection, the loss of which is psychologically equivalent to inner emptiness and void and loss of the ego.
- ... however, there is often more subtle clinical evidence that the lack of interest in the 'nice guy' and the attraction to the potentially 'bad' object are also motivated by conflicts pertaining to intimacy and the accompanying fear of engulfment. ... In short, object choice contributes to maintenance of one's identity.
- ... there is also a good deal of evidence that attachment and sexuality are mediated by different neurochemical systems...
- ... the specificity of conflict theory of psychosomatic illness has been pretty much abandoned, largely because of lack of empirical support...
- The capacity to delay immediate gratification is called upon not only in exchange for a greater reward associated with delay, but also in the context of renunciation of gratification in order to maintain one's self-esteem and one's sense of values. As far as I know, there is little work in this area. It represents a ripe area for future research.
- These findings indicate that capacity to inhibit action in the context of delay of gratification (through an attentional deployment strategy) in childhood is predictive of cognitive control in adolescence.
- One is not required to choose between satisfying one's need for autonomy and one's need for relatedness; fulfilling one appears to heighten the probability that the second will also be fulfilled. In short, as is predicted by attachment theory and supported by much research, there is no inherent conflict, but rather a dependent relationship between autonomy and relatedness (editor note: see theories of "secure base" in child development).
- It is not primarily infantile anti-social wishes that are embedded in conflict and subject to defense, but normal developmental strivings, in particular, strivings for separation, individuation, and self-realization.
- One sees this "chronic waiting" and "someday" way of life as an iatrogenic product in some analytic patients who, through collusion with their analyst, remain in analysis for an excessively long period of time waiting for some wonder to appear. Excessive delay would be an interesting area for future research.
- An experience of meaning has an impact on the mechanisms of ego functioning (including reduced anxiety, greater affect regulation, and a sense of structural integrity).
- ... as self psychology theory suggests, the resolution of inner conflict is not an important route to self or ego strengthening...
- ... only an optimal degree of positive illusions appear to be adaptive. Beyond that degree, positive illusions appear to be maladaptive
- ... the important point here is that individuals with a history of depression do not chronically express manifest dysfunctional attitudes and cognitions, but rather do so when already in a negative mood state. These findings suggest that the model in which depression is casually linked to chronic dysfunctional attitudes is an overly simplistic one.
- Whereas short-term denial of the seriousness of one's illness bestows benefits in the form of reduced anxiety and depression, in the longer term insofar as it is associated with relative failure to take the necessary lifestyle steps to reduce one's future risks of a heart attack, denial exacts serious costs.
- We all know that we are mortal and that death is inevitable. And yet, most of us live our lives as if this were not the case. At the very least, we engage in systematic and enduringly avoidant 'not thinking about it.' It is interesting, as Hoffman (1998) has observed, that psychoanalytic theory has little to say regarding anxiety about death (editor note: Kierkegaard much?); and when it does comment on it, it interprets it as an expression of a presumably more fundamental fear, such as separation anxiety or castration anxiety. It is as if psychoanalytic theory itself engages in denial regarding the reality of anxiety about death. Perhaps this is so because unlike separation anxiety or castration anxiety, there is little either psychoanalytic theory or practice has to offer in relation to this fundamental source of anxiety.
Editor note: People behave as if life is a given, but what is a given is death (Montaigne also has thoughts on this theme). All in all, there are (notably) two things before all people are equal - it is death and it is truth. While overthinking about death to point of shigurui won't bring us any joy or jouissance, the truth can give us much more, much better material. (Lest we forget that sometimes pursuit of truth becomes a suicide sport, and exactly that's why we have the Primum non nocere principle.)
- Examples of highly adaptive defenses include humor, suppression, and sublimation; below that level, neurotic defenses such as obsessional and hysterical ones; below that narcissistic defenses and disavowal; and below that major image-distorting and acting-out.
- Improvement in symptoms and level of functioning may lead to changes in defense rather than the other way around; or a third variable may lead to changes in defenses and improvement in symptoms, and level of functioning.
- It is clear that Freud believed that self-knowledge and knowing the truth about oneself (i.e., one's wishes, desires, and fantasies and the defenses against them) was not only an Enlightement value but also the path to clinical cure.
- It will be noted that this emphasis on helping the patient understand how his or her mind works is a new and perhaps more robust version of the fundamental belief that self-knowledge is curative.
- "The more a man can take reality as truth, appearance as essence, the sounder, the better-adjusted, the happier he will be ... this constantly effective process of self-deceiving, pretending, and blundering, is not a psychopathological mechanism." (Rank, 1936)
This is an extraordinary statement from a major psychoanalytic theorist. Perhaps one can no longer assume that knowing oneself and clinical 'cure' necessarily converge. One may need to consider the possibility that, at least in some cases, what is taken to be a successful analysis perhaps is more likely to lead more to enhanced self-knowledge than to clinical 'cure'.
Editor note: ... and here we go again to Nietzsche...
- The empirical evidence suggests that the two may not converge and may, indeed, in certain circumstances, diverge. (At the core of the issue here is the relationship between self-knowledge and well-being.)
- However, the concept of preconscious processes has not been adequately integrated into the psychoanalytic understanding of defense. Defenses can be implemented in a variety of different of ways, including failure to attend, failure to spell out, failure to make connections and understand personal import, failure to acknowledge as part of oneself, and failure to reflect and mentalize.
- Defenses can be fully understood not only in terms of what one is reluctant to tell oneself, but also in terms of what one is reluctant to communicate to others. Furthemore, the two are often inextricably intertwined.
- There is also an enormous amount of evidence supporting the hypothesis of unconscious mental processing.
- A major change in psychoanalytic theorizing about unconscious processes that has emerged is reflected in the shift from the conception of the "unconscious" as a "cauldron full of seething excitations" to an unconscious of 'rules', representations, and schemas largely formed in childhood, and often relatively resistant to change.
- Although Freud made a major contribution in recognizing the role of defense in psychological life, there is little evidence that defenses, including repressive defenses, necessarily operate at a fully unconscious level. Also, there is little evidence for the existence of a universal Oedipus complex, let alone for the claim that the vicissitudes of its resolution have a vital influence on psychological development.
- As we have seen, maladaptive representations may be altered through the therapeutic relationship itself, often without interpretation and insight.
- We have traveled a long way only to return to the early seminal idea that unintegrated or isolated mental contents (in Freud's version, isolated by virtue of conflict and defense) erode the unity of the personality.
- What becomes deeply valued is not simply, or perhaps, primarily, expansion of self-knowledge in the sense of gaining information about oneself, but such attributes as wholeheartedness, and the overcoming of ambivalence, self-deception (being true to yourself), and conflict.
Concluding: A.G.'s severe anxiety about leaving home, both figuratively and literally, and taking on an adult role became the central issue in treatment. The point I want to make with this clinical anecdote is the following: I know of no theory other than psychoanalytic theory, particularly its formulation of primary process thinking, that enables one to identify the common symbolic meaning among activities as disparate as placing a baking dish on a high shelf, mowing the lawn, and receiving job promotion.
Ironically, this very strength of
psychoanalytic theory in finding hidden common motives and meanings in
disparate activities is also a potential problem. This is so because the
meanings identified in the patient's productions are often arbitrary,
far removed from the patient's experience, and vary with the analyst's
theoretical orientation (see Peterfreund, 1978). Therefore, it becomes
very difficult to distinguish between theoretical impositions and
interpretations warranted by the clinical evidence.
At their worst, psychoanalytic interpretations and formulations are
often arbitrary and obfuscatory, far removed from observation and
unsusceptible to empirical test by any means. Further, given the nature
of psychoanalytic training and education, there appears to be no
reliable self-correcting mechanism that enables psychoanalysts to
distinguish between the plausible and testable, on one hand, and the
arbitrary and obscure, on the other. Unfortunately, it appears that
psychoanalytic formulations are increasingly arbitrary, obfuscatory, and
distant from observation and evidence. Equally unfortunate is the odd
appeal this kind of theorizing seems to have to a large number of
psychoanalysts.